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ESSAY
CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS FROM EUROPE
George A. Bermann *
Given his range of interests, a tribute to Francis Jacobs
could appropriately address just about any area of contemporary
legal concern. But Francis Jacobs is one whose writings on and
off the bench have, for an American, been especially illuminat-
ing, due to his unique capacity to translate fundamental issues of
European constitutional law into terms that we can grasp. And
so, notwithstanding the quantity of writing on the recent consti-
tutional adventure of the European Union ("EU") that has al-
ready accumulated, I add yet one more set of reflections on this
theme in Francis Jacobs' honor, this time on the possible lessons
of that adventure for others.
All legal transplants are problematic, constitutional trans-
plants especially so. And constitutional transplants for federal
systems are among the most problematic of all. Still, especially
in light of the apparent derailing of the EU's Draft Constitu-
tional Treaty, the question of the relevance of EU constitution-
making for constitution-making in federal-style systems else-
where seems nothing less than compelling.
In the interest of ease and brevity, I bypass the problem of
defining even some of the most essential terms, such as federal
or federal-style system, or even constitution. I also assume an
affirmative answer to some fairly fundamental questions. Do all
genuine federal systems require a constitution? And must a con-
stitution (whether or not the document calls itself by that name)
be written?
Two problematic themes emerge most forcefully from the
EU constitutional adventure we have just witnessed. One is the
utter importance of a sense of identity, and the other is the
profound challenge of satisfactorily organizing the processes of
democratic participation. The two are, of course, linked.
But we should begin by asking what it is, after all, that a
* Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Law and Gellhorn Professor of Law,
Columbia University School of Law.
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constitution, and more particularly a constitution for a federal
system, is supposed to do. I posit that a constitution-whether
written or unwritten and, if written, whether denominated a con-
stitution or not-expresses a consensus about what I call funda-
mental governance ground rules for a given polity.
The ground that basic governance rules cover in a federal
constitution is not altogether different from the ground covered
by the basic governance rules found in the constitutions of uni-
tary Nation-States. They deal with: (a) the institutions, including
their composition and their powers; (b) the procedures for en-
acting authoritative norms, including legislation and constitu-
tional amendment; (c) fundamental substantive principles, such
as democracy or secularism; and (d) paramount among these
fundamental principles, basic civil, political, and human rights
that are meant to be removed from the everyday political pro-
cess.
But there are certain additional ground rules that the con-
stitutions of federal systems either express or will simply be
deemed to express. What are the subjects of these additional
"federalism" ground rules? One set of ground rules specific to
federalism has to do with competences. What is to be done at
what level? What criteria are to be consulted in deciding what is
to be done at what level? And who is it who decides what is to be
done at what level in case of dispute as to that? Where compe-
tences are, in a sense, concurrent, does some notion of federal
self-restraint (let us call it subsidiarity,1 for convenience) prevail?
A second set of ground rules has to do with primacy. Whose
policies, within their limits of competence, trump whose poli-
cies, and again, who decides in the event of dispute? A third set
of ground rules has to do with membership. Are new "member-
ships" in the federal or federal-style system to be entertained,
and on what conditions and according to what procedures? May
1. The Treaty of Maastricht introduced the principle of subsidiarity into the Treaty
Establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty") through Article 5 (initially Article
3b). See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 0.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, as amended by Single European Act,
0.J. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741). The TEU was signed at Maastricht, the
Netherlands, on February 7, 1992, and entered into force on November 1, 1993. A
brief description of the principle of subsidiarity can be found in George Bermann, Tak-
ing Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 332 (1994).
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existing members secede (or, in the EU Constitution's parlance,
"withdraw"), and, if so, on what terms? A fourth set of ground
rules concerns specifically the question of whether and how the
constituent States, qua States, are to be represented in institu-
tions at the federal level. Finally, a further set of ground rules
relate to a variety of "transversal" issues. Is there to be at the
federal level a bill of rights? If so, shall it apply only to "federal"
actors (as well, possibly, as to State actors implementing federal
law), or instead to all "State actors"? Or will the protections en-
shrined in the constitutions of the Member States suffice? Is the
conduct of external relations (including foreign relations) to be
entrusted exclusively to the federal level, or do the members re-
tain some prerogatives in that domain?
Interesting though these various sets of federalism ground
rules are-and they are-they all, in my judgment, proved more
or less tractable within the Convention for the Establishment of
a Constitution for Europe.2 The Convention resolved all of
these issues, though in many respects, admittedly, it did not work
on a clean slate, but rather borrowed prior treaty rules and prior
understandings and conventions. Moreover, the intergovern-
mental conference ("IGC"), which approved the constitutional
text, which was then eventually put before national parliaments
and national populaces for approval, largely ratified the solu-
tions that the Convention had reached.' Indeed, none of the
issues that most roiled the delegates during the course of the
Convention's debates and deliberations-namely, the allocation
of competences between the EU and the Member States, the
composition of the Commission, the voting rules in the Council,
the relationship among Commission President, President of the
Council of Ministers and President of the European Council, or
2. See RogerJ. Goebel, The European Union in Transition: The Treaty of Nice in Effect;
Enlargement in Sight, A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FoRDHAM INT'L LJ. 455, 485-88 (2004)
(describing the role and work of the Convention).
3. Among many valuable articles on the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe, Dec. 16, O.J. C 310/1 (2004) (not yet ratified), are Alan Dashwood &
Angus Johnston, The Institutions of the Enlarged EU under the Regime of the Constitutional
Treaty, 41 COMMON MKT L. REv. 1481 (2004); Grdinne de Bfirca, The Drafting of a Consti-
tution for the European Union: Europe's Madisonian Moment or a Moment of Madness?, 61
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 555 (2004); Koen Lenaerts & Damien Gerard, The Structure of the
Union According to the Constitution for Europe: The Emperor is Getting Dressed, 29 EUR. L.
REv. 289 (2004); and Elisabeth Zoller, The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe and
the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 391
(2005).
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the prerogatives of the Minister of Foreign Affairs-seems to
have had anything to do with causing the Draft Constitution to
falter in the national referenda.
In short, to those of us who naively thought that the accept-
ance or rejection of a constitution would have something to do
with the content of the Constitution, the drama associated with
the referenda comes as something of a wake-up call, or at least a
sober reminder that things are not always as they seem.
I. THE UNDERLYING POLITY: A QUESTION OF IDENTITY
In the end, what caused the Draft Constitution to falter-to
the extent that the EU, as distinct from purely domestic national
politics, had anything to do with it-were doubts, confusion and
disquiet about the nature of the Union itself and its relationship
to the people.4 The referenda seem to have functioned, and at
any rate came to be viewed, more as a referendum on the enter-
prise with which the constitutional text was associated than on
the terms of the Constitution itself. The EU experience reminds
us, perhaps more powerfully than any other recent federalism
experience has done, that the footings of a constitution for a
federal system are only as firm as the relational premises on
which they are placed.
To state the proposition differently, the writing of a consti-
tution for most unitary Nation States typically takes place only
after a political consensus has been reached that an area and its
peoples are ripe for nationhood. Thus, in the usual course of
things, the making of the constitution follows the emergence of
a sense of nationhood. The best, but by no means only, example
is the creation of a State following a war of liberation from the
previously dominant power. This is not to say that the very pro-
cess of drafting of a constitution will not itself further deepen a
people's sense of nationhood, but that same process can also re-
veal fractures not before seen, or seen so clearly, and thus actu-
ally weaken the sense of nationhood.
As if by definition, the constituting of a federal system is a
more delicate, and possibly even treacherous, exercise. Con-
sider some of the reasons why a federal system may be set up. It
4. See Richard Bernstein, Europe is Still Europe, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2005, at A10; see
alsoJohn Thornhill, How Consensus in Favour of Yes Began to Drift Away, FINANCIAL TIMES
(London), May 30, 2005, at 6.
[Vol. 29:601
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may be a case, like the EU, of preexisting sovereignties willing,
but only to a degree, to join their political and economic fates.
It may be a case of a previously unitary State whose people con-
sists of such sufficiently distinct religions, ethnicities, or linguis-
tic heritages that a federal-type system appears to more faithfully
map the demographics of the population. Settings such as these
cause one to ask, even as the constitutive process unfolds, just
how deep are the convictions fueling the act of federation and
how substantial the reservations. The entire exercise may be suf-
fused with ambivalence.
In short, it is by no means uncommon for the construction
of a federal or federal-type system to actually precede, rather than
follow, the achievement of a consensus among the affected popu-
lations as to the type of association that is being created. It may
not even be obvious to the populace whether they are building a
"federal State" (Bundesstaat, in the German terminology),' a con-
federation of States (Staatenbund),6 or something in between
(Staatenverbund, or loose federation).7 It is a small wonder that
5. See Giorgio Malinverni, The Classical Notions of a Confederation and of a Federal
State, in SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY, No.11, THE MODERN CONCEPT OF CON-
FEDERATION 39, 41 (1994) ("In contrast [to a confederation], a federal state is not a
mere union of states, since the constituent communities are not sovereign states from
the standpoint of international law. Only the federal state itself... takes the form of a
state. The federated entities are not states, as their powers are derived from the federal
constitution rather than from international law. This situation gives rise to a process in
which the member states lose their identity as states and the federation acquires state-
hood. This crucial distinction is found in the terminology of the German literature,
which contrasts the ideas of Staatenbund and Bundesstaat.").
6. See Malinverni, supra note 5, at 40-41; see also DANIEL E.AZAR, FEDERAL SYSTEMS
OF THE WORLD: A HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL, CONFEDERAL AND AUTONOMY ARRANGEMENTS
xvi (2d ed. 1994) (defining confederation as several pre-existing polities joined to-
gether to form a common government for strictly limited purposes, usually foreign af-
fairs and defense, and more recently economics, that remains dependent on constitu-
ent polities in critical ways and must work through them); LISTER, supra note 5, at 22-26
("A confederation may be defined as a lasting union, based on public international law
agreement, between two or more states which retain their sovereignty and their legal
equality and which propose to achieve common internal and external goals by means of
their union.").
7. See Larry Cata Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism
and the European Union, 7 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 173, 201-02 (2001) ("We are presented with
a vision of the meaning of federalism within the European Union quite different from
that being constructed by the institutions of the European Union. It is a vision of the
EU as an association of Member States which retain their separate national identity
(Staatenverbund), not as a Federal State having its own identity (Bundesstaat)."); see
also Karl M. Meessen, Hedging European Integration: The Maastticht Judgment of the Federal
Constitutional Court of Germany, 17 Foa.DHAM INT'L L.J. 511, 525-26 (1994).
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constitution-making on uncertain attitudinal premises such as
these sometimes falters, especially when it is not at all clear that
the pre-constitutional status quo is itself an untenable or unvi-
able one. (We know that the pre-constitutional status quo was
not an untenable or unviable one precisely because we know
that now, even after the constitutional defeat, the EU will con-
tinue to function adequately into the future on the same treaty-
style basis it has always known).
To be sure, a variety of factors compete in helping to ex-
plain the derailment of the European Constitution: punishment
of national politicians; an unfavorable economic moment; mis-
givings over past and imminent enlargements (a consideration
which is not, of course, unrelated to the underlying identity
question); the prospect of the Turkish accession and xenopho-
bia more generally (again, not unrelated to questions of iden-
tity); not to mention a gargantuan and poorly articulated consti-
tutional text. But the identity question-what is it exactly that is
being created and how fully does it entail a commingling of
destinies-was fundamental.
The question naturally arises whether the Convention could
have produced a Constitution for Europe that, by virtue of its
very terms, might have sufficiently appeased the fears-rational
and irrational alike-of the peoples of Europe that it would have
passed muster with the people in all the national referenda that
were to be held. Even if it were possible to do so, would the
terms have to have been such as to do violence to certain of the
core values on which the Union was built? These are open ques-
tions. But, in my judgment, the architects of the Treaty Estab-
lishing a Constitution for Europe did not really even try.
A fair rejoinder to my claim would be that the problem was
neither the Constitution nor the larger identity issues I have
been alluding to, but the simple fact that the Draft Constitution
was put to a popular referendum in France and the Netherlands
when it did not need to have been. In a sense, that is correct.
Had the Constitution not been submitted to referenda in those
countries (and in neither was a referendum constitutionally re-
Staatenverbund emphasizes constituent elements rather than the organization as a
whole. "The term Staatenverbund apparently has to be credited to Paul Kirchhof, the
judge rapporteur of the Maastricht proceedings, who declared his preference for that
term as opposed to the term 'supranational organization,' which in his view, implies an
erosion of the statehood of its members." Id.
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quired), the identity question would not have been allowed to
loom so large. The decision in those States, as in so many of the
other Member States, would have been made by national parlia-
mentarians, probably with a quite different outcome. Indeed,
while the Draft Constitution did go down to defeat in popular
referenda in these two core and original Member States (al-
though not in Spain or Luxembourg),' it had not as of then
failed ratification in any system in which ratification required
parliamentary action only.
This brings me to the second problematic aspect of constitu-
tion-building in federal systems.
II. DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION: IS IT A REQUISITE?
When one thinks of national constitutions in modern uni-
tary States, one tends to assume direct popular participation-if
not, of course, in the drafting of the constitution, then at least in
its approval and entry into force. Recent constitution-making in
Afghanistan and Iraq come conspicuously to mind.' That has
not, of course, always been the situation. National constitutions
have often in the past been approved without direct popular ref-
erendum; even some of today's most robust and stable constitu-
tions-the Constitution of the United States, for example-not
only came into force without direct popular referendum, but
can be and are amended without direct popular referendum.
But if an original constitution for a unitary State would, to-
day at least, most likely require direct popular approval, this is by
no means the case for the constitution of a federal system. Yes, it
seems very likely-though not certain-that popular approval
would be needed today in order for a previously unitary State to
be transformed, constitutionally, into a federal State. But as in
the case of so many other regional-type federalisms being con-
templated in the contemporary world, the EU has been put in
8. See Europa, Procedures Planned for the Ratification of the European Constitu-
tion tbl. [hereinafter Ratification Table], http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratifica-
tion-en.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) (noting that the Netherlands rejected ratifica-
tion by both parliamentary vote and consultative referendum and that France rejected
it by referendum).
9. See generally Hannibal Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghani-
stan and Iraq, 3 Nw. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 4 (2005) (analyzing legal developments in
Afghanistan and Iraq, with a particular focus on Afghanistan's new constitution, while
"drawing parallels between the Afghan constitutional process and the ongoing process
of transitioning Iraq").
2006]
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place by and among previously sovereign States. And it is on
that same model that the EU was to have acquired for itself a
constitution. It is by no means obvious that arrangements of this
sort necessarily require the direct popular approval of the sev-
eral populations involved.
Federal arrangements run an enormously wide gamut in the
extent to which they require direct popular approval. Arrange-
ments that lie at the purely intergovernmental end of the spec-
trum rarely require direct popular approval. The North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement,' ° for example, was not subjected to
popular approval, by referendum or otherwise, in the United
States. The EU itself presents an uneven picture. If I am not
mistaken, none of the six original Member States subjected
membership in the EU to a national referendum, though some
have subjected certain sets of amendments to the founding trea-
ties to such a referendum." The only State ever to negotiate
accession and then reject it (Norway) did so-twice-on account
of a national referendum. To be sure, some of the newer Mem-
ber States decided to put the question of accession to the EU to
a referendum. But, as we know, only in a minority of States was
it thought that, either as a legal or as a political matter, ratifica-
tion of the Draft Constitutional Treaty required a popular refer-
endum.12
If I am correct that what failed to be accomplished by refer-
endum in France and the Netherlands could have been accom-
plished in those same two countries by parliamentary ratification
(and if no insurmountable obstacles to ratification were to sur-
face in any of the remaining States), then "process" would in-
deed have proven to have been a pivotally outcome-determina-
tive consideration.
This prospect raises a question of the margin of freedom
that the architects of federal systems have in determining the
10. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Juris-
prudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. LJ. 1885, 1890 n.25 (2005) (noting that the
constitutionality of the North American Free Trade Agreement's approval process was
subject to heated scholarly debate).
11. See Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FoRDHAm INT'L L.J. 1092, 1174-75 (1995).
12. See Ratification Table, supra note 8 (showing that of the twenty-five Nations set
to ratify the Constitution, only eight planned to use a referendum in place of, or in
addition to, a parliamentary vote).
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process by which, and venues in which, the critical deliberations
and decisions over constitutional ratification will take place. If
the identity stakes within a federal or federal-style system are
great enough, direct democratic legitimation may be required,
even if that may eventually cause the constitutional enterprise to
falter. Political leaders in other parts of the world who entertain
the idea of establishing some form of federal or federal-style re-
gime composed of previously sovereign States need to carefully
determine whether the programmatic gains from federating are
sufficient to justify as apparent a commingling of national popu-
lar interests as the EU and its Constitutional Treaty conjured,
because doing so may imply precisely the need for direct popu-
lar approval that will not be forthcoming.
